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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM G. CARVER, doing
business as CARVER SHEET
:METAL WORKS,
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CASE NO.

vs.

7374

W. T. DENN, doing business as
HUBBARD-DENN
JEWELERS,
Defendant a;nd Respondent.

Appellant's Brief
STATEI\fENT OF FACTS
This action was instituted by plaintiff and appellant
upon a complaint (Tr. 1), which alleged that the plaintiff
between certain dates, at the special instance and request
of the defendant, furnished the material and performed
the labor in installing a Palmer Evaporative Air Conditioner in defendant's place of business in Salt Lake City,
Utah, at an agreed price of $850.00 and that said sum had
not been paid. The answer of the defendant ( Tr. pp. 4
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and 5) admitted the installation of the Palmer Evaporative Air Conditioner and the non-payment therefor and,
as an affirmative defense, the defendant set up an implied
warranty. The plaintiff's reply denied any warranty.
(Tr. p. 7). This case was tried to the Court who found
in favor of the defendant on his theory of an implied warranty and plaintiff's motion for a new trial was thereafter denied.
The evidence In this case shows that Mr. Fred
Dunn, an employee of the defendant, approached Mr.
George Maycock and informed him that the defendant
was interested in the installation of an air conditioner.
(Tr. p. 54 and 55). Mr. Dunn stated "We are figuring
on putting an air cooler in and I knew he (l\Ir. George
Maycock) was in the air cooler business, so I asked him
if he would come and contact Mr. Denn about it." :Mr.
Fred Dunn further stated that Mr. George Maycock did
come to the defendant's place of business and did discuss
with the defendant this installation.
Mr. William T. Denn, the defendant in this action,
also testified to conversations with George Maycock and
with Mr. Andrew Maycock in which the installation was
discussed and Mr. Denn further stated that he knew Mr.
Maycock personally and knew that he was engaged in a
business which he referred to as the Maycock Engineering Company. (Tr. pp. 42, 43 and 44).
Mr. George Maycock, called as a witness for the
plaintiff, testified in substance that Fred Dunn, an employee of the defendant, first asked him to come to the
defendant's place of business to discuss the installation
2
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of an air cooling device. That he did so, and, after several meetings with the defendant, W. T. Denn and with
Fred Dunn, they decided upon the installation of a
Palmer EvnporatiYe Air Conditioner. 1\ir. George Maycock further testified that W. T. Denn suggested that
Can·er Sheet :Metal Works be asked to do the installation. The evidence further reveals that Mr. Jack Goaslind, representing the plaintiff, came to the defendant's
place of business, made certain measurements under the
direction of George ~laycock and thereafter installed the
Palmer Evaporative Air Conditioner under instructions
furnished by George Maycock. (Tr. pp. 39 to 46 and
pp. 70 to 73.)
The record also shows that the A. A. Maycock Company, at the time of the transaction in question, was
engaged in the heating, ventilating and air conditioning
business and was the representative of the company that
manufactured the Palmer Evaporative Air Conditio~er.
(Tr. pp. 37 and 38.)
Further, all of the evidence negatives any conversations, discussions or negotiations of any kind between the
plaintiff and the defendant other than the actual contract
of installation.
STATEl\iENT OF ERRORS
1. That the Court below erred in granting judgment
to the defendant and against the plaintiff.
2. r~rhat the Court below erred in denying plaintiff's
motion for a new trial.
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ARGUl\tfENT
The only question to be determined upon this appeal
is the proper application of Section 81-1-15, Utah Code
Annotated, 1943, and particularly, subdivisions (1) and
( 4) of this section, to the facts recited above; or, in other
words, can an installer, who is neither the dealer or the
manufacturer, of an article, which is described by its
patent or trade name, be charged with an implied warranty of quality, particularly where there is a complete
absence of any evidence of reliance by the buyer upon
the installer.
All of the cases that we have found involve an action
between a buyer and a seller, who is either the manufacturer or the dealer, and we have found no case dealing
,,·ith the precise set of facts in the case at bar. However,
it would seem that those cases dealing with the question
where it involves the buyer and a seller, who is also the
dealer, where there is no reliance by the buyer upon the
seller, should be conclusive of the question involved here.
The editors of American Law Reports, Annotated,
at 59 A. L. R. 1180, make the following introductory
remarks to the annotation of this problem contained
there:
''The raising of an implied warranty of fitness depends upon whether the buyer informed
the seJler of the circumstances and conditions
which necessitated his purchase of a certain general character of article, and left it to the seller to
select the particular kind and quality of article
suitable for the buyer's use. And this is true without reference to whether the rules of the common
law or the Uniform Sales Act apply, except that
4
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under the latter act a dealer is placed under the
same responsibility as a manufacturer, and the
term 'trademark' or 'tradename' is employed,
rather than the term, 'specific, described article.'
Under either rule the major question, in determining the existence of an implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose, is the reliance by the
buyer upon the skill and judgment of the seller
to select an article suitable for his needs, and the
question as to whether the article was described
by its tra.dename or trademark is not conclusive,
if the other conditions exist which would raise an
implied warranty of this character."
And at 59 A. L. R. 1192, in this same annotation, the
editors make the following remarks:
''The question whether the buyer relied upon
the skill and judgment of the seller is also involved in more or less confusion. According to
the great weight of authority the facts must be
such as to indicate the selection of the article by
the seller, or there must be something tantamount
to a selection of the article by him, rather than by
the buyer, in order for the case to come within
the rule relative to an implied warranty of fitness.
vVhile it would not be practical to attempt to indicate the particular facts which might be sufficient
to show a selection by the seller, or a reliance by
the buyer upon the skill and judgment of the
seller, and the latter's assumption of a superior
knowledge or skill, it seems clear tl1at the n1ere
fact of knowledge by the seller of the purpose for
which the buyer desired the article is not sufficient,
nor will evidence of representations by the seller
relative to the desirable qualities of the article,
amounting to no more than trade talk, be sufficient
to show a reliance by the buyer upon the skill and
knowledge of the seller.''
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And, continuing at 59 A. L. R. 1197, there Is the
following general statement:
''Where the buyer selects some article by its
tradename or trademark as suitable for his particular purpose or needs, there is no implied warranty that the article will be fit for this particular
purpose, or suitable for the peculiar needs of the
buyer, even though he has communicated to the
seller his particular use for or need of the article,
or the seller has otherwise obtained information
in this respect. ' '
And in support of this statement, cases from numerous
jurisdiction are cited on the two pages following this
quotation in A. L. R.
There seem to be only two Utah cases dealing with
the questions involved here. The first is the case of
Landes & Co. v. Fallows, 81 Utah 432, 10 P. (2nd) 389.
This case dealt with the sale of a second hand Gleaner
harvester with a Fordson engine and in a suit to recover
the purchase price the defendant pleaded a breach of an
implied warranty. The court found a nonwarranty clause
in the contract precluded any implied warranty but went
on to say: ''Moreover, there is no warranty of fitness
where the buyer orders a specific article for a specific
purpose known to the seller."
The second Utah case is Battle Creek Bread Wrapping Machine Co. v. Paramount Baking Co., 88 Utah 67,
39 P. (2d) 323. This action was brought in replevin to
recover certain machinery and the defense was a breach
of an implied warranty of quality. The court made the

6
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following statement, after finding that the contract of
sale contained a written guarantee as to performance:
"The fact that an article has a trade name
does not negative an implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose, where it is purchased,
not by name, but for a particular purpose and
supplied for that purpose. In the present contract, the machine was ordered by the name of
'Duplex Wrapping ~lachine.' I-Iad the contract
remained silent as to warranties, there would have
been some justification for the conclusion that it
was a purchase of a specified known article.''
A good statement of the law applicable to these situations is found in the case of Oil Well Supply Co. v.
Watson, 168 Ind. 603, 80 N.E. 137, 15 L.R.A. (X.S.) 868,
59 A.L.R. 1181, where the court said:
''There are but few subjects of the law that
appear, upon a. cursory examination of the authorities, to be in such a hopeless state of confusion as
that which relates to what constitutes proper exceptions to the rule of caveat emptor. A closer
study, however, will reveal that the apparant .
disagreement is largely the result of unguarded
language employed by judges and writers not in
sympathy with the harshne~s and apparent incongruities of the old rule; and while there has been
much breaking away from the ancient maxim, and
considerable difference in the paths chosen, yet the
ostensible conflict is due quite as much to the difference in the facts of particular cases as to the
doctrine applied. 'The maxim of "caveat emptor",' says Mr. Story, 'seems gradually to be restricted in its operation and limited in its domain,
and beset with the circumvallations of the modern
doctrine of implied warranty, until it can no longer
claim the empire over the law of sales, and is but
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a shadow of itself.' Story, Sales, 4th ed. Page 359.
It may be said, however, that when chattels are
sold generally for all purposes to which they are
adapted, and the seller is not the manufacturer
or producer, and the property is in existence and
may be inspected by the buyer, and there is no
fraud on the part of the seller, the maxim 'caveat
emptor' applies, even though defects exist in the
goods which are not discoverable on examination.
The doctrine of caveat emptor rests upon the
principle that the purchaser sees, or may see and
know, what he buys; and, not demanding an express warranty, it will be conclusively held that
he was content to rely upon his own judgment;
and if the goods prove inferior in quality, the pur-·
chaser has no remedy, but must bear the loss
himself.''
And again in Iron Fireman Coal Stoker Co. v. Brown
(1931), 182 Minn. 399, 234 N.W. 685, the court says:
''The spirit and intent of subd. 4 of the statute is that the seller is not held to an implied warranty because the buyer gets the distinct thing
selected by him, an exact article, for which he
bargains. So, acting upon his own desires, he takes
his own chances as to the fitness of the article, and
should not be permitted to complain of the seller
who has supplied him with the very thing he
sought. B. B. Sturtevant Co. v. LeJ\fars Gas Co.
(1920), 188 Iowa 584, 176 N. W. 338. In such
cases it is not important that the buyer discloses
to the seller his intentions as to the use of the
article. It is usually helpful to determine upon
whose judgment and responsibility the purchase
was made. Or, to state it another way, if the thing
is itself specifically selected and ordered, the buyer
takes upon himself the risk of its effecting the
desired purpose. Under such circumstances, the
la\v does not impose an implied \\Tarranty; nor
8
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should it. The situation is quite different where
the buyer yields to the trade talk of a salesman
who sells him something that is wholly unknown
to him. Perhaps it might be said that, where
the buyer selects the article, subd. 4 applies, and,
where the seller selects the article suitable for the
purpose needed, subd. 1, hereinafter mentioned,
applies. "\Ve are of the opinion that, where the
buyer fully informs the seller of his particular
needs, and the seller undertakes to select or supply an article suitable for the purpose involved,
subd. 1 applies even though the article may be
described in the contract of sale by its tradename * * * These are authorities that seem to
put a strict construction upon this provision of
the Uniform Sales Act, and hold that, if the contract describes an article by the tradename, there
is no implied warranty, but such authorities apparently involve cases where the contract discloses
the article sold under a tradename and the record
fails to disclose any circumstances such as are
involved in this case. It would seem that such a
contract, in the absence of evidence of circumstances to the contrary, should be construed under
the statute as if the purchaser had selected the
article purchased.''
In the case of Dunn Road l\!l:achinery Co. v. Charlevoix Abstract & Engineering Co., 247 1\Iich. 398, 225 N.vV.
592, 64 A.L.R. 947, the Court quotes with approval from
2 Mechem, Sales, Section 1349, as follows :
''The implied warranty of fitness is not to be
extended to cases which lack the necessary conditions upon which it depends. The essence of the
rule is, that the contract is executory; that the
particular article is not designated by the buyer;
that only his need is known; that he does not undertake or is not able to determine what will best
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supply his need and therefore necessarily leaves
the seller to make the determination and take the
risk; and if these elements are wanting, the rule
does not apply. If a known, described and defined
article is agreed upon and that known, described
or defined article is furnished, there is no implied
warranty of fitness, even though the seller is the
manufacturer ,and the buyer disclosed to him the
purpose for which the article was purchased.''
And this same section is again quoted with approval in
another Michigan Case, Sibley Lumber Co. v. Schultz,
297 N.W. 243.
The following cases are also cited as holding that
there can be no implied warranty that the article will suit
the particular needs of the buyer where it is selected by
its tradename or trademark; even though the buyer has
communicated to the seller his particular use for or need
of the article, or the seller has otherwise obtained information in this respect :
Generall\iotors Acceptance Corp. v. Jerry,
181 Ark. 771, 27S.W. (2d) 997;
Oil \Vell Supply Co. v. Hopper, 129 I{an. 300,
282 Pac. 701 ;
Henderson v. United States Sheet & Window Glass
Co., 168 La. 66, 121 So. 576;
May Oil Burner Corp. v. :Munger, 159 Md. 605,
152 A. 352;
Snelling v. Dine, 270 Mass. 501, 170 N.E. 403;
Whitty Mfg. Co. v. Clark, 278 Mass. 370,
180 N.E. 315;
Damman v. Mercier-Bryan-Larkins Brick Co.,
253 Mich. 392, 235 N. W. 194 ;
Outhwaite v. A. B. Knowlson Co., 259 Mich. 224,
242 N.W. 895;
10
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Tinius Olsen Testing :Mach. Co., v. Wolf Co.,
~97 Pa. 153, 146 A. 541;
~Iadison-I~ipp Corp. v. Price Battery Corp.,
311 Pa. ~:2, 166 A. 377 ;
Russell Grader :Mfg. Co. v. Budden, 197 Wis. 615,
:2~:2 N.W. 788;
~Iallow v. Hill, 290 \Vis. 426, 245 N.W. 90.

vV e

again call attention to the testimony contained
in the record. ~ir. George :Maycock, an employee of A. A.
~Iaycock Company, a firm handling air cooling equipment
meets ~Ir. Fred Dunn at a luncheon meeting. Mr. Dunn,
an employee of the defendant, asks l\fr. :Maycock to call
upon the defendant as the defendant is desirous of installing such equipment in his store. Some days later Mr.
:Maycock calls upon the defendant and in due time they
agree upon the type of equipment to be installed. Thus
far the plaintiff has not entered into the picture. However, the defendant, upon learning that the A. A. Maycock Company does not do the installation work, suggested that the work be done by the plaintiff. The plaintiff
tendered a bid, which included the type of air cooler
selected by the defendant and performed the installation
as outlined by the Maycock Company and as they desired
it to be done and to their complete satisfaction. The
plaintiff accordingly was not required to do anything
except to install the equipment, and, insofar as the testimoney shows, he did his work properly.
And, in conclusion, may we emphasize, at the risk
of repetition, the elements necessary to create an implied
warranty of fitness where the article is sold by a trad~
name. First, the article must be selected by the seller
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and not de signa ted by the buyer. Second, the buyer must
be shown to have relied on the seller to select the article.
Third, the buyer's needs must be fully communicated to
the seller. In the instant case, the record shows that there
was no discussion between the plaintiff and the defendant
as to the air conditioner furnished or as to any other
kind of air conditioning. The plaintiff did not select the
air conditioner but on the contrary was directed by the
defendant to install the named air conditioner. And
finally the record negatives any reliance by the defendant
on the plaintiff and affirmatively shows that the defendant was placing his reliance upon a third party.
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the
trial court was erroneous and should be reversed and
judgment entered for the plaintiff upon his complaint.
Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT B. PORTER
ROBERT B. PORTER, JR.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appella;nt
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